We present an optimization model of the European natural gas market which is intended for the use within a regulatory approach providing incentives for efficient transmission investments. The stylized model is designed as welfare maximization taking into account production, pipeline, LNG, and storage constraints. We develop several scenarios to analyze the future development of the European natural gas market.
Introduction
In order to develop a regulatory regime that provides incentives for pipeline owners/operators to invest in new pipeline infrastructure we need a simplified representation of the European natural gas market containing information on pipeline capacities, entry and exit points of the system, LNG landing facilities, and storage capacities. Whereas numerical modeling exercises regularly try to forecast market situations this paper describes a simplified representation of the main natural gas infrastructure in Europe. In later studies the model can be used as market representation to test a proposed regulatory model which removes existing cross-border bottlenecks in the European long-distance natural gas pipeline system.
We are interested in identifying existing transportation bottlenecks and the impact of Investments into Transmission facilities of natural Gas on the market outcome (InTraGasModel). Therefore, we design a welfare maximization approach subject to constraints of natural gas infrastructure facilities. The focus is on optimization of the long-distance transport neglecting influences of strategic company behavior on the exporter side, interaction of traders in Europe, or market power concerns on the intra-European transmission network level.
The literature on natural gas transportation models mainly distinguishes three approaches. The system dynamic approach has been applied by two studies so far (Stäcker, 2004; Hallouche and Tamvaski, 2005) . EWI Cologne has produced a series of linear optimization models (EUGAS, TIGER, MAGELAN), of which the TIGER model provides the most detailed dispatch model for Europe and is suited for identifying congestion (Perner and Seeliger, 2004; Lochner and Bothe, 2007) . The dynamic model optimizes long-term European natural gas supply taking into account production and transportation facilities. Model outputs are mainly flows and supply costs. In order to allow for strategic behavior, market power and other market imperfections of the (European) natural gas market recent literature dominantly relies on the complementarity framework. In a first application Mathiessen et al. (1987) show that the European natural gas market is best described by a Cournot duopoly. The following works by Golombek et al. (1995 Golombek et al. ( , 1998 distinguish between up-and downstream players in the natural gas market and show the positive impact of market restructuring on upstream competition and welfare. Several streams within this literature evolved, which focus on (and study) different issues such as multi-period modeling and supply disruptions, double marginalization, or the cartel creation of exporters settings. The World Gas Model (WGM) provides a high level of granularity in a game-theoretic context while still covering 95% of world natural gas production (Egging et al., 2009 ). Holz (2009 discusses these different model families in more detail.
Investment in infrastructure in all of these models is best described as a net present value calculation optimization. Hence, even if the complementarity framework so far has attracted the largest share of researchers and literature it has yet not been able to include a convincing regulatory investment mechanism. The next section provides the model formulation and specifies the data sources. Section 3 applies the model to a set of stylized scenarios and discusses the results. We conclude with an outlook on further research in this area.
Model Formulations and Data
The InTraGas model represents a stylized representation of the existing European natural gas network including the major non-European exporting countries, i.e. Russia or Algeria, and the transit countries. The model takes into account storage, pipeline and LNG restrictions and can be utilized to obtain a competitive benchmark including congestion mark-ups. This section provides the mathematical formulation and the underlying dataset.
Model formulation
The market model 5 is formulated as non-linear optimization program maximizing social welfare under the assumption of perfect competition taking into account technical constraints: To take account of the dynamic nature of the natural gas market the model consists of 12 periods t that represent one month each. Storage plays an important role in natural gas markets to manage demand and production variation during seasons. 6 The storage level store n,t at a site in period t is defined by the previous periods storage level store n,t-1 and injections to (s in ) and withdrawals from (s out ) storage (equation 7). We assume that over one year the injected and withdrawn amounts sum to zero. The previous periods storage level store n,t-1 in the first period t=1 is therefore set equal to the resulting storage level in the last period t=12. The storage level as well as injections and withdrawals are further limited in their maximum capacities (equation 8).
The market is cleared via a nodal energy balance constraint (equation 9). All injections at a node n (left hand side of equation 9) have to be at least as big as all withdrawals at that node (right hand side of equation 9). LNG injection and withdrawals take account of losses during liquefaction and regasification processes. Incoming LNG flows (LNGflow m,n ) are reduced by the factor η to account for energy needed for regasification reducing the amount of available natural gas for demand (d n ) or pipeline transport (flow n,m ). Outgoing LNG flows (LNGflow n,m ) are increased by the factor 1/μ to take into account energy needed for the liquefaction process. Thus, the required amount of produced natural gas (g n ) increases in order to balance the constraint. The nodal market price is derived via the obtained optimal demand d* and the linear demand function p(d). The model is incorporated into GAMS using Conopt as solver.
Data
The underlying dataset is based on publicly available sources. The reference data is calibrated to represent 2005 values and is provided on a monthly basis covering a representative year.
Seasonal fluctuations in demand and supply of natural gas as well as storage patterns can thus be captured. The network is a stylized representation of the existing gas pipeline system aggregating all facilities within one country into one node. Cross border connections between countries are summed up within one pipeline connecting the respective country nodes. The market includes the Western and Central European countries with a surrounding system of major natural gas exporting regions for both pipeline and LNG ( Figure 1 ).
6 Due to the monthly time level storage utilization due to short term variations is not taken into account. countries indigenous production is defined as maximum production capacity. For the European natural gas exporting regions Norway, the Netherlands and the UK we consider December production as maximum capacity constraint. The production constraint for nonEuropean natural gas exporting countries is determined by dividing the yearly production values using Norway's monthly production schedule as reference and the December value as maximum capacity constraint.
Production costs (c n ) are taken from OME ( Reference demand is taken from the same sources as production data (IEA, 2006; and BP, 2006) . The coverage includes all Western and Central European countries up to Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia as eastern boundary (see Figure 1) . Demand of other 7 Russia-Yamal, Russia-Nadym-Pur-Taz, Russia-Volga-Ural and Russia-Barent Sea -Baltic Sea. Transportation costs for pipeline transmission are derived from OME (2005) and transposed into a transport price per km and transported volume (tc n,m ). Given the representation of a country as a node we define the length of a pipeline as the distance between the two country centers.
Natural gas underground storage capacities per country are characterized by three parameters:
working gas volume (store 
Scenarios and Results
We simulate several future developments for the European natural gas market to identify possible congestion problems and price developments. The model resembles a competitive environment thus market power concerns are neglected and the obtained prices represent a lower boundary.
Scenarios
We first derive a 2005 reference case with the above described dataset as benchmark (see Table 1 ). The remaining scenarios represent developments up to 2015. All cases rely on a basic extension of the reference case including additional pipelines, LNG terminals, production sites and demand adaptation (IEA, 2008; GSE, 2009) . To keep our model simple and tractable production costs and the reference price of 2.75 €/MBTU are kept constant across all scenarios. We assume that demand will increase by an average of 1.5% per year until 2015 (IEA, 2008) . Production in Europe will decline by about 7% whereas production in the exporting countries will increase by 10% to 94% (IEA, 2008) . Several pipeline projects are expected to become operational by 2015. The most important ones are the North-and South-Stream connecting Russia directly with European import countries avoiding transit through Belarus or the Ukraine, and the Nabucco pipeline connecting the Caspian gas fields with Europe mitigating the dependence on deliveries from Russia.
Regarding LNG facilities we include all projects that are under construction according to IEA (2008) and scheduled until 2015. On the exporting side in particular Qatar will extend its capacities significantly. On the importing side the UK currently expands its capacities significantly, but also Belgium and the Netherlands are going to diversify their supplies by adding regasification facilities. Spain, Italy, and France are extending their existing capacities to a similar level of import capacity by 2015. Among the major natural gas importing countries only Germany will have no opportunity to import LNG in 2015.
Regarding gas storage nearly all European countries are planning extensions of their existing capacities (GSE, 2009). The basic extension set represents the 2015 base case (i.e. the expected market development until 2015). This case is adjusted subsequently to test the impact of several possible future developments in three further cases. First, a significant decline of indigenous production within Europe is modeled (EU case). We assume that the Netherlands and Norway face a 20% lower production level and the UK faces a sharp decline to 30% of its 2005 production capacity (Gabriel et al., 2008) . The reduced local production will increase import dependence of Europe and most likely lead to a higher price level.
Second, we assume that Russia has a conflict with its transit countries and cuts its supplies via Belarus and the Ukraine (Russian case). As we assume that the North-and South-Stream pipelines are finished by 2015, Russia can still rely on those for its exports to Europe. Nevertheless, the reduced transmission capacity will lead both to quantity and price movements in Europe. Finally, we assume a further extension of LNG facilities in Europe and exporting countries which could reduce import dependency of Europe on natural gas from Russian (LNG case). An overview of the adjusted dataset for the scenarios is presented in Table 2 . 
Scenario results
In the 2005 reference case we observe a separation of Europe into several price zones: In the first scenario (EU case) we assume a significant decline in North Sea production until 2015. The UK and Ireland face the highest price increase due to the assumed reduction of UK production to 30% of its 2005 level. Other countries depending on North Sea natural gas (France, Benelux, and Germany) also face price increases whereas prices in the remaining European countries are not affected. The price level increases to 2.58 €/MBTU on average.
LNG import facilities remain to be fully utilized. The lack of indigenous production is compensated by increasing imports from Russia and consequently the pipeline system in Eastern Europe is operating at a higher load level.
In the second scenario we assume that Russia cuts its transports to Europe via transition countries (Russian case). This shutdown of a significant share of Europe's imports has a significant price impact particularly on Central and Eastern European countries that heavily rely on Russian natural gas. The average price level rises to 3.25 €/MBTU. Germany acts as a transmission platform due to its still intact connection to Russia via the North-Stream pipeline and provides natural gas to Poland and the Czech Republic. Similar, the South-Stream pipeline is utilized to supply the South-Eastern region and the Nabucco pipeline is used to transport Caspian gas to Europe. However, the available capacities are too small to cancel out the effect of the Russian export reduction.
In a last scenario we extend the available LNG importing facilities in Europe and the exporting facilities in producing countries. This provides the European market with an increased diversification potential (LNG case). Consequently the price level in Europe is more equalized and significantly lower than in all other cases. The average price level is about 2.06 €/MBTU. In particular, the Iberian Peninsula profits from the increased LNG availability, but also Central Europe faces lower prices and less pipeline congestion. The import dependency of Europe from Russian natural gas is even below the Russian case. Overall, in this case Europe has four large import countries with equal share of supplies (Figure 3 ). 
Discussion
The modeled cases show the possible impact of future developments of the European natural gas transmission infrastructure. European import dependency is to increase given the expected rise of demand for and a simultaneous decrease in indigenous production of natural gas. For a faster decrease in production than expected this dependency will increase even further (EU case). As major pipeline projects allow Russia to export more natural gas to Europe, the major share of future imports is still coming from there. Under the 2015 base case the full extent of export capacities is not even utilized as particularly the North-Stream pipeline seems to be oversized (Table 3) .
Increased LNG export capacities provide a source of diversification for European countries.
Within the model particularly Qatar directs a large share of its exports to Europe given its relative low production costs. The Nabucco pipeline only plays a minor role in our model as the availability of Russian natural gas is sufficient to meet European demand. Only in the case of an interruption of Russian exports does the availability of Caspian gas provide a hedge for European customers. LNG facilities will have the largest impact on the future development since they provide an optimal diversification opportunity and thus allow a range of export countries to supply Europe (Table 3 ).
The obtained results have to be evaluated against the background of assumptions and simplification of our model. First of all, the model does neglect a large part of the world natural gas market and thus misses possible impacts of international developments on the European market. This holds in particular for our LNG results since other importing countries are not included and consequently the full export capacity is available to European countries only within our model. Second, only the Central and Western European countries are included with a demand schedule. East and South East European countries are only transit points and thus their demand for natural gas is not part of our model allowing the natural gas transmission pipeline system to be exclusively used for exports to the modeled countries.
The network furthermore represents a stylized system of the real world network. All pipelines connected to a country are connected with one another. Thus, the pipeline from the Caspian region is connected with the Russian South-Stream within Hungary. Also, the pipelines are mostly directed and a reverse of natural gas flows (e.g. in case of a Russian boycott) is not possible within the model. Finally, the model neglects any strategic behavior of market participants. Thus the obtained results provide the lower boundary for expected price developments. Given the market imperfections and the integration of the European natural gas market into a worldwide framework with competing regions for limited supplies (US, Asia) the real world developments are likely to result in a higher price level and a tighter congestion situation. 
Conclusion
In this paper we present a stylized model of the European natural gas market with a focus on gas transmission. The model is intended to be used as market representation within a regulatory model approach which provides incentives for pipeline owners/operators to invest in new pipeline infrastructure. Consequently the model setting is simplified and only covers the main natural gas infrastructure in Europe.
We simulate several scenarios to estimate the future development of the European natural gas market. Despite its simplified structure the obtained results highlight the existing bottlenecks in Europe, the importance of natural gas from the North Sea for the Central European region, the import dependency of Europe from Russian natural gas, and the price decreasing impact of LNG facilities. Further research will focus on the introduction of regulatory mechanism that encourages investment in cross-border long-distance natural gas transportation pipelines.
In particular, the European grid will be considered to be operated by a European regulatory authority which then faces the difficulty to provide investment incentives in this capitalintensive industry. 
